

detailed environmental statement when the regulatory action taken by the Commission under the statutes under the jurisdiction of the Commission will have a significant environmental impact. The specific regulations implementing NEPA are contained in part 380 of the Commission's regulations.

[Order 486, 52 FR 47910, Dec. 17, 1987]

STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 1970, AS AMENDED, AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS 11615 AND 11627

AUTHORITY: Sections 2.90 through 2.102 issued under 84 Stat. 799, as amended, 85 Stat. 38, unless otherwise noted.

§§ 2.100—2.102 [Reserved]

§ 2.103 Statement of policy respecting take or pay provisions in gas purchase contracts.

(a) Recognizing that take or pay contract obligations may be shielding the prices of deregulated and other higher cost gas from market constraints, the Commission sets forth its general policy regarding prepayments for natural gas pursuant to take or pay provisions in gas contracts and amendments thereto between producers and interstate pipelines which become effective December 23, 1982. The provisions of this policy statement do not establish a binding norm but instead provide general guidance. In particular cases, both the underlying validity of the policy and its application to particular facts may be challenged and are subject to further consideration.

(b) With respect to gas purchase contracts entered into on or after December 23, 1982, the Commission intends to apply a rebuttable presumption in general rate cases that prepayments to producers will not be given rate base treatment if the prepayments are made pursuant to take or pay requirements in such gas purchase contracts or amendments which exceed 75 percent of annual deliverability.

(Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717-717w; Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350, 15 U.S.C. 3301-3432)

[47 FR 57269, Dec. 23, 1982]

§ 2.104 Mechanisms for passthrough of pipeline take-or-pay buyout and buydown costs.

(a) *General Policy.* The Commission as a matter of policy will provide two distinct mechanisms for passthrough of take-or-pay buyout and buydown costs of interstate natural gas pipelines. The first is pursuant to existing Commission policy and practice. Under this method, pipelines may pass through prudently incurred take-or-pay buyout and buydown costs in their sales commodity rates. The second method is available to pipelines which agree to an equitable sharing of take-or-pay costs and which transport under part 284 of this chapter. Qualifying pipelines may utilize the alternative passthrough mechanisms described in this section. Where a pipeline agrees to absorb from 25 to 50 percent of take-or-pay buyout and buydown costs, the Commission will permit the pipeline to recover through a fixed charge an amount equal to (but not greater than) the amount absorbed. Any remaining costs up to 50 percent of total buyout and buydown costs may be recovered either through a commodity rate surcharge or a volumetric surcharge on total throughput.

(b) *Cost allocation procedures.* A pipeline's volume-based surcharges must be based on the volumes which underlie its most recent Commission-approved rates. Fixed charges must be based on each customer's cumulative deficiency in purchases in recent years (during which the current take-or-pay liabilities of the pipelines were incurred) measured in relation to that customer's purchases during a representative period during which take-or-pay liabilities were not incurred. The allocation formula employed must incorporate the following guidelines:

(1) A representative base period must be selected. The base period must reflect a representative level of purchases by the pipeline's firm customers during a period preceding the onset of changed conditions which resulted in reduced purchases and growth of the take-or-pay problem.

(2) Firm purchases by each customer during the base year under firm rate schedules or contracts for firm service must be determined.

(3) Firm sales purchase deficiency volumes for each subsequent year must be determined.

(4) A fixed charge based on each customer's cumulative deficiencies as compared to total cumulative deficiencies must be derived. The filing pipeline will be free to select for rate calculation and filing purposes a reasonable amortization period for buyout and buydown costs being recovered through fixed charges or volumetric surcharges. The pipeline will be entitled to interest at the rate set forth in part 154 of this chapter on unamortized amounts.

(c) *Implementing procedures.* (1) Pipelines acting pursuant to this section may submit on or before December 31, 1990, a non-PGA rate filing under section 4(e) of the Natural Gas Act. Pipelines may include in their filings a fixed charge and a volumetric surcharge to recover buyout and buydown costs actually paid as of the date of filing plus similar costs which are known and measurable within the following nine months. Detailed support for the amounts claimed and for the calculation of customer surcharges must be provided. In addition, the pipeline must disclose and describe all consideration, both cash and noncash, given to producers in exchange for take-or-pay relief.

(2) In any filings made under this section, pipelines must include proposals for periodic (preferably annual) adjustments to customer surcharges, together with any necessary accounting procedures, designed to assure that revenues recovered by the pipeline remain in balance with buyout and buydown costs covered by the filing and actually incurred by the pipeline.

(d) *Prudence.* (1) The Commission will examine the issue of prudence if it is raised by a party in an individual proceeding. If it is raised, the pipeline will be required to demonstrate the prudence of take-or-pay buyout and buydown costs which it seeks to recover from its customers through both fixed and volume-based charges.

(2) The Commission intends to exercise its authority to the full extent permitted by the Natural Gas Act to approve take-or-pay settlements. The Commission intends to approve

uncontested take-or-pay settlements which are consistent with this section and found to be in the public interest. The Commission will also, if it appears reasonable and permissible to do so, approve contested settlements as to all consenting parties and initiate separate hearings to establish the rates for opposing parties. Alternatively, the Commission will approve contested settlements on the merits if supported by substantial evidence in the record. In any case where hearings are held as to the prudence of take-or-pay buyout and buydown costs, the Commission will permit the pipeline the opportunity to recover all take-or-pay costs found to be prudent from the contesting parties on a proportional basis, even if the amount allowed is greater than the amounts initially sought to be recovered by the pipeline.

(e) *Flowthrough by downstream pipelines.* Downstream pipelines must flow through approved take-or-pay fixed charges based on the cumulative purchase deficiencies of their customers. Volumetrically-based surcharges must be flowed through on a volumetric basis. Customers of downstream pipelines have the right in connection with either PGA or general rate filings to challenge the purchasing practices of such pipelines. Remedies for purchasing practices found by the Commission to be imprudent will be determined on a case-by-case basis.

(f) *Ongoing proceedings.* Pipeline rate proceedings pending September 15, 1987 may be utilized as a forum for implementing the approved cost recovery mechanisms set forth in this section. Permission will be granted in cases where implementation of this policy in pending proceedings appears feasible, will not result in inordinate delay, or can be expected to result in unnecessary or cumulative rate filings with the Commission. In the event permission is granted, the presiding judge(s) will allow pipelines to supplement their filings to the extent necessary to assure compliance with the filing and data requirements set forth herein. The presiding judges shall also establish any procedures necessary to protect the rights of all parties. Any rates established pursuant to this section will be permitted to become effective only

prospectively upon Commission approval.

(g) *Scope.* This section does not go beyond the Commission's determination in the April 10, 1985, policy statement (Docket No. PL85-1-000) that take-or-pay buyout and buydown costs do not violate the pricing provision of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA). It is not intended to affect take-or-pay prepayments made by pipelines and included in account 165 and in their rate bases. Nor does it address the issue of whether take-or-pay prepayments to a producer for gas not taken and which cannot be made up violate the Title I pricing provisions of the NGPA. This policy statement applies only to buyout and buydown costs paid by pipelines that are transporting under part 284 of this chapter, under existing contracts, and is not intended to disturb in any way take-or-pay settlements previously entered into between pipelines and their producer suppliers.

[Order 500, 52 FR 30351, Aug. 14, 1987, as amended at 52 FR 35539, Sept. 22, 1987; Order 500-F, 53 FR 50924, Dec. 19, 1988; 54 FR 52394, Dec. 21, 1989; Order 581, 60 FR 53064, Oct. 11, 1995]

§ 2.105 Gas supply charges.

An interstate natural gas pipeline that transports under part 284 of this chapter may include in its tariff a charge, not related to facilities, for standing ready to supply gas to sales customers in accordance with the following principles:

(a) The pipeline may not recover take-or-pay or similar charges from suppliers by any other means.

(b) The pipeline must allow its sales customers to nominate levels of service freely within their firm sales entitlements or otherwise employ a mechanism for the renegotiation of levels of service at regular intervals.

(c) The pipeline must announce prior to nominations by the customers a firm price or pricing formula for the service, and hold that price or pricing formula firm during the interval arranged in paragraph (b) of this section.

(d) By nominating a new level of service lower than its current level, a customer has consented to any abandonment sought by the pipeline commensurate with the difference between

the current level of service and the nominated level.

[Order 500, 52 FR 30352, Aug. 14, 1987; 52 FR 35539, Sept. 22, 1987, and 54 FR 52394, Dec. 21, 1989]

RULES OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY

§ 2.201 [Reserved]

STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY AND INTERPRETATIONS UNDER THE NATURAL GAS POLICY ACT OF 1978

§ 2.300 Statement of policy concerning allegations of fraud, abuse, or similar grounds under section 601(c) of the NGPA.

Recognizing the potential for an increasing number of intervenor complaints predicated on the fraud, abuse, or similar grounds exception to guaranteed passthrough, the Commission sets forth the elements of a cognizable claim under section 601(c)(2) which it expects to apply in cases in which fraud, abuse, or similar grounds is raised. The provisions of this policy statement do not establish a binding norm but instead provide general guidance. In particular cases, both the underlying validity of the policy and its application to particular facts may be challenged and are subject to further consideration. The procedure prescribed conforms with the NGPA's general guarantee of passthrough by placing the burden of pleading the elements and proving the elements of a case on intervenors who would allege fraud, abuse, or similar grounds as a basis for denying passthrough of gas prices incurred by an interstate pipeline.

(a) In order for the issue of fraud, as that term is used in section 601(c) of the NGPA, to be considered in a proceeding, an intervenor or intervenors must file a complaint alleging that:

(1) The interstate pipeline, any first seller who sells natural gas to the interstate pipeline, or both acting together, have made a fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment; and

(2) Because of that fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment, the amount paid by the interstate pipeline to any first seller of natural gas was higher than it would have been absent the fraudulent conduct.